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ARISTOTLE

OF

MORALS

TO

NICOMACHUS.

BOOK THE FIRST.

TRANSLATED

By EDM^D. PARGITER, Esq;

With a short Account of the AUTHOR prefixed And with Notes from *Andronicus*, *Eustratius* and Others.

Inspitere Exemplar Vitæ Morumque ⏑ – –
– ⏑ ⏑ – – *et Veras hinc ducere voces.* HORAT.

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ARISTOTLE

OF

MORALS

TO

NICOMACHUS

It is difficult for a Writer, as he is a Man, not to Err in many things, in ſome being Ignorant entirely, in ſome Judging falſely, in ſome Writing inattentively.

Galen. ap. Fabric. Biblioth. Gr. Vol. I.

TRANSLATED

BY EDM. PARGITER, ES^{Q};

With a ſhort Account of the AUTHOR prefixed And with Notes from Gulielmius, Piccartus and Others.

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ARISTOTLE *was both by Father and Mother deſcended of the Noble Family of the* Aſclepiadæ: *the Picture of his Mother is mentioned by* Pliny, *as one of the celebrated Pieces of* Protogenes. *His Father dying when he was young, his Education under a Guardian was ſuitable to his Birth and Genius. At ſeventeen Years of Age he betook himſelf to the Study of Philoſophy under* Plato, *whoſe Hearer he continued to be for about twenty years. He was for his Underſtanding called by his Præceptor the Mind of his Auditory; and for his Studiouſneſs he was alſo Denominated by him, the Reader. Though* Ariſtotle *for the ſake of Truth (as it appeared to him) Diſſented from* Plato, *yet this Inſcription teſtifies his Gratitude:*

This Altar *Ariſtotle* erected
To the Memory of *Plato*, a Man;
Whom not to Praiſe ſeems to the Wicked Juſt.

What Reputation he was in, may be Inferred from this Epiſtle. " Philip *to* Ariſtotle *Greeting. Know that a* " *Son has been born to me: I do therefore give many* " *Thanks to the Gods, yet not ſo much for the Birth of* " *the Boy, as that he is born in the time of your mature* " *Age: For I hope that he being Educated and Taught by* " *you will become worthy both of us and of the Succeſſion of* " *our State.*" Philip *at the intreaty of* Ariſtotle *Reſtored his Native City to Freedom, permitted it to be Rebuilt*

and allowed Ariſtotle *to give Laws to the Citizens: they in return kept annually a Feſtival-Day in Honour of him and erected an Altar to his Memory. He was ſo much in Favour with* Philip *and* Olympias *the Father and Mother of* Alexander, *that they placed his Statue with their own. The People of* Athens *alſo had his Statue put up for his Good Services to their State in an Embaſſy to King* Philip. *His Pupil* Alexander *likewiſe paid great Deference and Honour to him. After five or according to ſome eight years Attendance on that Prince he retired to* Athens, *where he taught Philoſophy for about thirteen years. He then became Hated by the Superſtitious and by the Factious and in order to avoid the Malice of ſuch Adverſaries he retired to* Chalcis, *ſaying with Alluſion to the Death of* Socrates, *that he would not permit the* Athenians *to Offend twice againſt Philoſophy: ſome ſay that on this occaſion he took Poiſon; others, that his Death was Natural of a Pain and Weakneſs in his Stomach, to which his Conſtitution was in ſome meaſure liable and which cloſe Application to Study had rendered more grievous. He died in his ſixty third year, before* Chriſt *about three hundred twenty two years. He was Moderate in his Manners but inclining (as Great Minds are commonly diſpoſed) to the Vices of Exceſs rather than to thoſe of Defect. He wore fine Cloaths and Rings; he alſo uſed Shaving contrary to the Cuſtom of* Plato *and other Philoſophers: wherefore the Buſtoes and other Repreſentations of him ſhould be without a Beard. Becauſe laſt Wills are generally thought to give an Inſight into the genuine Characters of Perſons; it may not be improper to mention*

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ſome Particulars of Ariſtotle's *Will. He directs his Daughter to be given in Marriage to* Nicanor *the Son of his Guardian and if* Nicanor *dies before the accompliſhment of the Marriage and does not otherwiſe Order by his Will, in that caſe that ſhe might be given to his Favourite Scholar, unto whom he left his Library: he Provides generouſly for his Miſtreſs as to Money, Slaves, Houſe and Furniture; and alſo Recommends to his Executors, if ſhe is inclined to marry, to get a ſuitable Husband for her: he Orders a Youth left to his Guardianſhip to be reſtored to his Friends in an handſome manner and with all his Eſtate: he Manumits ſeveral of his Slaves and bequeaths Legacies to them; and he directs that his young Slaves be not ſold, but kept till they are of a ripe age and, if they deſerve it, that they be Manumitted: though he dies in ſo good Humour with his Miſtreſs, he does not forget the Requeſt of a Wife, whom he had before, that her Remains be depoſited with his own: in the Dedication of ſome Statues according to the Rites of his Time and Country, he ſhows himſelf Grateful to his Guardian and to the Wife of his Guardian, mindful of his Guardian's Son, Pious to his Mother and Affectionate to his Brother both deceaſed. Three of his Apothegms deſerve here to be Recited: being reproached, that he gave Alms to a wicked man, he ſaid, I did not pity his Morals but the Man; it was a Saying of his, that ſome were ſo ſparing as if they were to live for ever, others ſo expenſive as if they were to die immediately: being asked, what Benefit redounded to him from Philoſophy, he anſwered, to do without being commanded what ſome do for fear of the Laws. By this sketch of*

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Ariſtotle's *Life, the Reader will eaſily perceive him to have been a Scholar, a Gentleman, a Man of Wit and Taſte, no Pedant, a Lover of his Country, one who was Humane, Beneficent and who fulfilled Honourably all the Offices of a Good Man. His Reſidence at the Courts of* Philip *and* Alexander *and at* Athens *the Seat of Learning and Politeneſs for the moſt part of his time afforded him ample Opportunities of knowing Men and Manners. Who therefore could be a more fit Teacher of Morality? eſpecially, if it be conſidered, that he wrote this celebrated Work a little before his Death, when his unruly Paſſions, if ever he had any, muſt have ſubſided. It is Inſcribed to* Nicomachus *his Natural Son by his Miſtreſs mentioned in his Will, out of Paternal Affection or to do Honour to him, as the Cuſtom was among the Antients in ſuch Inſcriptions, and perhaps for his Uſe, when he might be of an Age mature to imbibe theſe his Father's Precepts.*

It being intended, that ſome Diſſertation Relative to the Author, to the Work, or to the Subject ſhall be prefixed to each of the ten Books, let this ſuffice as a Preliminary Diſcourſe to this firſt Book; which treats of Happineſs in general, ſets forth wherein it conſiſts, and argues that it is, or ought to be the Chief End of all Human Actions.

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CHAP.

CHAP. I.

EVERY Art and Method and likewiſe every Action and Præelection ſeem to aim reſpectively at ſome Good: wherefore they well pronounced the Good, to be that which All things aim at: but there ſeems to be ſome difference of Ends: for ſome indeed are Energies; others are ſome Works excluſive of Energies. In thoſe things, whereof there are ſome Ends excluſive of Actions, the Works are better than the Energies. Actions and Arts and Sciences being many, Ends are alſo many: For Health is the End of the Art Medicinal, a Ship of the Art of Ship-Building, Victory of the Art of commanding an Army, Riches of the Art Oeconomical. Whatſoever Arts of ſuch ſort are under ſome one Power; as the Art of making Bridles, is under the Art of Horſemanſhip; and whatever Other Arts there are, relating to Horſeman-like Inſtruments; and as Horſemanſhip alſo, and every Military Action, is under the Art of Commanding an Army; and as other Arts are in the ſame manner, under different Powers; in All of them, the Ends of the Architectonic Arts are more eligible than all the Ends of thoſe under them: becauſe for the ſake of the Architectonic the other Ends are purſued; and it differs nothing, whether Energies themſelves are Ends of Actions, or whether ſomewhat elſe excluſive of Energies is an End, as in the ſaid Sciences.

CHAP. II.

IF of things reducible to Action there is ſome End, which we covet for its own ſake, and other things for it; and if we do not chuſe all things for ſomewhat different (for thus Choice would go on to what is Infinite, ſo as that Appetite would be vain and fruitleſs) it is manifeſt that ſuch an End muſt be the Good and the Beſt thing. And therefore the Knowledge thereof, is of great moment in relation to Life, and as Archers having a Mark, we ſhall the more eaſily attain to what is Behoveful. And if ſo, let us endeavour to comprehend in a Sketch, what this End is, and which of the Sciences or Powers it belongs to. It would indeed ſeem the End of the moſt Principal and chiefly Architectonic: and ſuch does the Art of Government appear. For what Sciences there is need of in States, and what ſort of them each one is to learn, and to what degree, this Art ordains. And we ſee the moſt Honourable Powers ſubſervient to it, as the Art of commanding an Army, the Oeconomical Art, the Rhetorical Art. For the Science of Government making Uſe of the remaining Practical Sciences, and alſo laying down Laws what is expedient to do, and from what to abſtain, the End of this may well take in the Ends of the others. So that the Art of Government may be the Good of Man. For if Good is the ſame with regard to one Man and to a State, it appears greater and more perfect, to acquire and to preſerve Good to a State. Good is amiable in one alone, but more

more beautiful and more divine in a Nation and States. This Method therefore has theſe things in view, being in ſome ſort Political.

CHAP. III.

A Thing may be ſaid to be adequately treated of, if it be explained according to the Subject Matter: For Exactneſs is not equally in all Diſcourſes to be Required; as neither is it in the Works of Common Artificers. Things Honourable, and Things Juſt, which fall under the Conſideration of the Art of Government, have ſo great Difference and Uncertainty, as to ſeem to Be only by Law, not by Nature. Such ſort of Uncertainty too have things that are Good, becauſe from them Detriments have happened to many: For of old time have ſome periſhed, on Account of their Wealth, others by their Strength. Sufficient it is therefore, ſince we diſcourſe of ſuch and from ſuch things, to mark out the Truth groſsly and in a Sketch; and, ſince we diſcourſe of things, that do for the moſt part happen, and, from ſuch, it is enough alſo to make Concluſions that do for the moſt part happen. And after this manner the Auditor ought to underſtand whatſoever is here ſaid. For it is the part of a learned Perſon to require according to each ſort of thing, ſuch Exactneſs, as the Nature of it admits: For it ſeems to be alike to receive with Approbation a Mathematician talking perſwaſively, as to demand of a Rhetorician Demonſtrations. Each Perſon judges well of thoſe things which he

knows; and of things known, one well-taught in each, is a good Judge of each; and one well taught in All, is a good Judge abſolutely. Wherefore a young Man is not a proper Auditor of the Doctrine of Government: For he is not experienced in the Actions of Life; and Diſcourſes on Government are from and of the Actions of Life. Moreover as he is apt to follow his Paſſions, he will hear in vain and unprofitably; ſince the End is not Knowledge but Action. Nor does it differ, whether he be young in Age, or juvenile in Manners: For the Defect is not from time; but becauſe he lives and purſues every thing according to Paſſion. Knowledge therefore to ſuch is unprofitable, as it is to the Incontinent: but to Know concerning theſe things, may tend to the great Improvement of Perſons, who order and direct their Appetites according to Reaſon. Thus concerning the Auditor, and in what Senſe every thing is to be taken, and as to what we propoſe let ſo much be ſaid by way of Proœm.

CHAP. IV.

LET us go on in our Diſcourſe reſuming what we ſaid before. Since every Knowledge and Præelection purſues ſome Good, what is It, which we ſay, that, the Art of Government aims at? and What is the higheſt Good of all things, which are reducible to Action? As to the Name indeed there is an almoſt Univerſal Conſent; for both the Many and the Elegant call It Happineſs; and to Live Well, and to Do Well, they apprehend to be the

the ſame with being Happy: But concerning Happineſs, what ſort of a thing it is, is the Controverſy. And the Many do not explain it in like manner with the Intelligent: For there are, who ſay, that it is ſome one of thoſe things, which are conſpicuous and apparent, as Pleaſure or Wealth, or Honour; and others another thing: oftentimes the ſame Perſon a different thing; for being ſick, he ſays it is Health; being in want, Riches; thoſe, who are conſcious to themſelves of Ignorance admire the Speakers of ſomewhat great and above them: Some again think, that, beſides theſe many Goods, another ſomewhat is good of itſelf, and which to theſe, is the Cauſe that they are Good. And indeed it would be quite fruitleſs to examine all the Opinions; but it may be ſufficient to examine the moſt celebrated or thoſe that ſeem to have ſome Reaſon. But let it not eſcape us, that there is a Difference between the Reaſonings from Principles, and thoſe that lead to Principles: For *Plato* alſo did juſtly make a Doubt and Queſtion, whether the right Way is from Principles, or to Principles, as in a Courſe, from the Judges of the Race to the End, or contrarywiſe. We muſt indeed begin from things Known; theſe are twofold; for ſome are Known to us, and ſome are Known abſolutely: Probably therefore we muſt begin from thoſe Known to us. Wherefore he ought to be well Educated as to Manners, who would be a fit Auditor of the Doctrines of what is Honourable and Juſt, and of what is Political in general: For that there are things Honourable, and Juſt, and Political, is the firſt Principle; and if this ſufficiently appears, it will not be

neceſſary to require farther, Wherefore they are. And ſuch a Perſon either has, or may eaſily imbibe Principles: But to whom neither of theſe Characters is applicable, let him hear theſe Verſes of *Heſiod.*

Beſt is the Man, who without help Thinks well
And acts with Foreſight to ſucceſsful Ends;
Good too is he, whom ſound Advice perſwades;
But he, who Thinks not nor his Mind applies
To others Counſel, is a fruitleſs Man.

CHAP. V.

LET us proceed in our Diſcourſe, from whence we digreſs'd. They ſeem therefore to have taken up their Opinions of the Good and of Happineſs not unreaſonably from their ways of Life. For the Many and the moſt Illiberal call it Pleaſure; for they love a Voluptuous Life. There are three Ways of Life moſtly Præeminent, this juſt mentioned and the Political, and the third, the Contemplative. The Many therefore appear wholly like Slaves preferring the Life of Cattle: but they have reaſon; in as much as not a Few in Authorities have like Paſſions with *Sardanapalus.* The Elegant and Active call it Honour; but this appears to be more ſuperficial than the thing ſought after: For Honour ſeems to be rather in thoſe, who defer the Honour, than in the Perſon Honoured: But we gueſs the Good to be ſomewhat Proper and not eaſy to be taken away. Again they

ſeem to purſue Honour, that they may believe themſelves to be good; they ſeek therefore to be honoured by the Intelligent, and by thoſe to whom they are known and for Virtue. It is therefore manifeſt according to themſelves, that Virtue is better. Sooner and rather therefore, may any one take Virtue to be the End of the Political Life; but this itſelf appears in ſome degree Imperfect. For it ſeems to be contingent, that one Virtuous by Habit, may be aſleep on any occaſion, or be inactive through his whole Life; and moreover that he may ſuffer Evils and be under the greateſt Misfortunes: A Perſon in ſuch a State of Life no one can call Happy, unleſs it be to maintain a Paradox. Concerning theſe, let this be ſufficient: for of them it is alſo aptly Diſcourſed in my *Encyclia.* The Third is the Contemplative Life, which we ſhall take into Conſideration in ſome of the following Diſcourſes. The Money-getting Life is in ſome ſort laborious; and Wealth, it is plain, is not the ſought for Good; for it is no more than Uſeful and got for the ſake of ſomewhat elſe. Wherefore any one may rather eſteem the others before mentioned, as Ends; for they are Amiable for themſelves. But it appears, that neither they are Ends, though many Arguments have been collected to prove them ſo. Let theſe Opinions therefore be diſmiſs'd.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

IT is perhaps better to conſider Good univerſally, and to inveſtigate, how Good univerſally is meant: Albeit this is a diſagreeable Enquiry; for that Perſons Friends to us have introduced Ideas. But probably it would ſeem to be better and to be behoveful to deſtroy even one's own Opinions for the Preſervation of Truth, eſpecially as we are Philoſophers. For both being Friends, it is more upright to pay Honour to Truth by preferring it. Thoſe, who have entertained this Opinion, have not formed Ideas, in which they can ſay any thing to be Prior and Poſterior: wherefore neither have they framed an Idea of Numbers. But Good is ſaid in the Categorie of Subſtance, and in that of Quality, and in that of Relation: But what is of itſelf and Eſſence, is a Prior thing in Nature, to that which is Relative: For this is like to a Bough of a Tree, and to an Accident of that which Is: So that there cannot be ſome common Idea as to theſe. Again, ſince Good is ſaid in ſeveral Senſes equally to Being, (For it is ſaid in the Categorie of Subſtance, as a God and a Mind; and in that of Quality, the Virtues; and in that of Quantity, the Medium; and in that of Relation, the Uſeful; and in that of Time, the Occaſion; and in that of Place, a Dwelling Houſe; and ſo on in the other Categories) it is manifeſt, that it cannot be ſomewhat Common Univerſally and One: For it could not be ſaid in all the Categories, but in one alone. And again, ſince of thoſe things belonging

belonging to one Idea there is too but one Science, there ſhould alſo be but one Science of all Goods: but now there are many even of thoſe under one Categorie; as the Knowledge of Occaſion, in War is part of the Art of commanding, an Army, in Diſeaſes is part of the Art Medicinal; and Knowledge of Medium, as to Nouriſhment belongs to the Art Medicinal, as to Exerciſes to the Art Gymnaſtic. Any one may doubt, in what Senſe the *Platoniſts* mean to ſay the Idea of each thing; if it be ſo, that to the Idea of Man and Man there is one and the ſame Definition, that of Man; for as Man, they nothing differ: neither as Good, do the Idea of Good and Good differ. And to be laſting, does not make a Good more Good; if it be ſo, that a White Colour, that is durable, is not more White than one, that laſts but a day. The *Pythagoreans* are likely to ſpeak more probably concerning Good Univerſally, Placing One in their Coordination of Chief things; whom *Speuſippus* alſo ſeems to follow. But of theſe things let there be another Diſcourſe. Concerning what has been ſaid ſome Doubt ariſes, becauſe the Reaſons of *Plato* are not to be taken of every Good; but are ſaid according to one Species, to wit, thoſe that are purſued and amiable of themſelves. The Effective of things Good of themſelves and the Preſervative of them in ſome manner and the Prohibitive of the contrary are ſaid to be Good, for the ſake of thoſe that are Good of themſelves, and alſo in another ſenſe. So it is manifeſt, that Goods may be ſaid in a double meaning, ſome Goods of themſelves, others for the ſake of them. Having ſeparated therefore, from thoſe that are

no more than Beneficial, thoſe that are Good of themſelves, let us conſider, if the Goods of themſelves are ſaid according to one Idea. But what Sort of Goods ſhall one lay down to be ſo of themſelves? whether, whatſoever are purſued being ſingle, as to be prudent and to ſee and ſome Pleaſures and Honours? For though we do purſue theſe for ſomewhat elſe, yet one may rank them together with thoſe that are Good of themſelves: Or can one lay down no other thing as Good beſides Idea? So Idea will mean nothing. And if theſe things are ſome of thoſe that are Good of themſelves, it will be requiſite, that the Definition of Good ſhould be apparently the ſame in them all, as the Definition of Whiteneſs in Snow and Ceruſs: but of Honour, and of Prudence and of Pleaſure there are ſeveral and different Definitions as to the part whereby they are Good. Therefore Good is not ſomewhat Common according to one Idea. But how are they ſaid to be Good? for they are not like to thoſe things that have the ſame name by chance: But are they Good becauſe they proceed from one Good? Or becauſe they all end together in one Good? Or are they Good rather according to Analogy? For as in the Body is Seeing, ſo in the Soul is Mind and ſo one thing in another. But rather let us diſmiſs theſe things for the preſent: for to be accurate with regard to them may be more proper to another part of Philoſophy: in like manner alſo concerning Idea. For if there be one ſomewhat to be Prædicated Good in Common or ſomewhat that being ſeparated from all things is Good of itſelf, it is manifeſt, that it cannot be reduced to Action nor attained by

Man: and ſome ſuch attainable Good is the Object of our preſent Enquiry. But probably to know Good Univerſally may to any one ſeem more excellent, as it leads to Goods attainable and reducible to Action: for having that Model, we ſhall more eaſily know thoſe things that are alſo good for ourſelves; and if we do know, we are likely to attain, them. This Reaſoning therefore has ſome Probability, but ſeems to be Diſſonant from the Sciences. For all of them aiming at ſome Good and ſeeking what is wanted prætermit the Knowledge of Good Univerſally. And that all Artificers ſhould be ignorant of and not ſo much as enquire after ſo great an Help, is not conſiſtent with right Reaſon: and it is not eaſy to find out, what Benefit a Weaver or a Carpenter will receive towards his own Art by knowing the Good of itſelf; or how a man will be more a Phyſician or a better Commander of an Army by contemplating the Idea itſelf of Good Univerſally. For a Phyſician appears not to conſider Health in this manner, but the Health of Man and rather probably that of this Man; for he Practiſes according to each Perſon. And concerning theſe things, let them be here treated of thus far.

CHAP. VII.

LET us again return to the Good Enquired of and conſider, what it may be. For it appears to be different in a different Action and Art. For it is different in the Art Medicinal and in the Art of commanding an Army and likewiſe in other Arts. What is the Good in each? Is it that, for the ſake of which the other things are done? This, in the Art Medicinal is Health, in the Art of commanding an Army Victory, in the Art of Architecture a Building, in another Art another thing, and in every Action and Prælection, the End; becauſe for the ſake of this all men perform the reſt. So that, if there is ſome one End of all things reducible to Action, It muſt be the Good reducible to Action; and if there are more Ends, there muſt be more Goods. Our Diſcourſe having digreſſed reverts to the ſame Point; and we muſt endeavour yet more to explain the Good. Since there appear to be many Ends, and ſince of theſe we chuſe ſome on account of others, as Wealth, Flutes and generally things Inſtrumental; it is manifeſt, that all Ends are not Perfect: the Beſt End ſeems to be ſome Perfect thing: So that if there is ſome one End alone Perfect, it muſt be the Thing Enquired of; if there are Many Ends, the moſt Perfect of them. And we mean that, which is of itſelf to be purſued, to be more Perfect, than that, which is to be purſued for another End; and that, which is in no caſe Eligible for another End, more Perfect, than thoſe Eligible

Eligible both of themſelves and for another End. And the abſolutely perfect is what is always Eligible of itſelf, and never for another End. Such does Happineſs ſeem chiefly to be: for we chuſe It always for itſelf and never for another Cauſe. But Honour and Pleaſure and Underſtanding and every Virtue we indeed chuſe likewiſe for themſelves: (For though no Benefit accrued from them we ſhould Like them every one) and we alſo chuſe them for the ſake of Happineſs, expecting to be Happy by means of them. But no one chuſes Happineſs for the ſake of thoſe, nor Univerſally for another Cauſe; and this appears to happen thus from the Self-ſufficiency of Happineſs: For the Perfect Good ſeems to be Self-ſufficient. We mean by Self-ſufficient not only what is ſufficient for a Man's ſelf, but alſo for his Parents and Children and Wife and in general for his Friends and Fellow-Citizens; ſince by Nature Man is ſocial: but ſome limit is to be ſet to theſe; for if one extend this to Anceſtors and Deſcendants and to the Friends of Friends it proceeds to Infinity. But let us again Conſider, what is Self-ſufficient. We lay down Self-ſufficient to be that, which ſingly makes Life Eligible and wanting nothing. Such we take Happineſs to be and alſo the moſt Eligible of all things not being joined to any; but being joined to any thing, it is manifeſt, that it with the leaſt of Goods is ſtill preferable: for ſomewhat added is an Exuberance of Goods; and of Goods the greater is always Preferable. Thus Happineſs appears to be ſomewhat Perfect and Self-ſufficient, being the End of things reducible to Action. But perhaps to call Happineſs the Beſt

thing

thing appears to be Univerſally conſented to; but it is required that, what it is, ſhould be yet more evidently declared. And ſoon may this be done, if the part that Man is to Act be underſtood. For as a Player on the Flute and a Statuary and every Artificer and Univerſally thoſe who have any work to do or action to perform, ſeem to place their Good in the Work and in doing it well; ſo ſhould Man ſeem to do, if there is any proper part for him to Act. What, are there certain proper Works and Actions of a Carpenter and a Shoemaker? and is there none proper to Man? but is he born to be idle? Or, as there appears to be ſome Office of the Eye and Hand and Foot and in ſhort of every one of the Parts, may one not beſides all theſe lay down alſo ſome Duty Proper for Man? And what may this be? For to Live ſeems to be common even with Plants: but the Proper Work is Enquired of. We muſt therefore throw aſide the Nutritive and Growing Life. The next of courſe may be a ſort of ſenſitive Life; and this too ſeems to be common with the Horſe and the Ox and every Animal. There remains a ſort of active Life of a Creature having Reaſon; and one part of this Creature has Reaſon, as it is obedient to Reaſon; the other part, as it has Reaſon and Thinks. The Active Life being ſaid in two ſenſes, let us lay down that which is according to Energy; For it ſeems worthy to be called the more Proper. If there is a Part Proper for Man to Act, it is an Energy of the Soul according to Reaſon or not without Reaſon. And the ſame we ſay in general is the Part of this any Man to Act and of this any Virtuous Man; as in the Caſe of an Harper and of a skilful

skilful Harper; and abſolutely this is the ſame in all things, the Excellence according to Virtue being added to the Work. For it is the part of an Harper to Play on the Harp; of a skilful Harper to Play well. And if ſo, we lay down as the Part of Man ſome ſort of Life and this to be an Energy of the Soul and to conſiſt in Actions with Reaſon; and of a Virtuous Man to perform this well and with a good Grace. Every thing Well done is Perfected according to its proper Virtue; If ſo, the Good of Man is an Energy of the Soul according to Virtue; and if there are more Virtues, according to the Beſt and moſt Perfect and moreover in a Perfect Life: for one Swallow does not, nor does one Day, make a Summer; ſo neither does one Day nor a little time make a Man full of Delight and Happy. Let the Good therefore be thus Delineated; for it is probably neceſſary to sketch the Out-Lines firſt, then afterwards to Draw every Part: and it would ſeem to be the Duty of every one to add and accumulate thoſe things that are beautiful to the Delineation. And Time is wont to be an Inventor or a good Cooperator; from whence Improvements of Arts have ariſen: for it is the Office of every one to add what is deficient. And it behoves us to keep in Mind what has been ſaid before and not to require Exactneſs in like manner as to all things but as to each according to the Subject Matter and ſo far as is proper to the Method in hand: for a Carpenter and a Geometrician with a different View trace out a Right Line; for one does it ſo far as it is conducive to his Work; the other in order to know what it is or of what Sort it is;

for

for he is a Speculator of Truth. And the like is to be ſettled alſo in other caſes, that the Adventitious works may not be more than the Works themſelves. Neither muſt we demand even a Cauſe for all things after a like Manner, but it is ſufficient in ſome, if it be clearly ſhown, that the thing is; which holds alſo concerning Principles. For, that a thing exiſts, is Primary and a Principle. And of Principles ſome are known by Induction, ſome by Senſe, ſome by a ſort of Habitude. We muſt endeavour to inveſtigate each Principle according to its reſpective Nature; and we muſt ſtudy, how they may be well defined: for Definitions are of great Moment with reſpect to what is to follow. It ſeems therefore, that a Beginning is more than half of the Whole and that by a Principle many of thoſe things that we enquire into become perſpicuous.

CHAP. VIII.

WE muſt conſider Happineſs not only from the Concluſion, and from thoſe things that enter into the Definition, but alſo from whatſoever is ſaid concerning it. For all things that ſubſiſt do indeed correſpond with Truth; but from Falſehood, Truth does ſoon diſagree. Goods being diſtributed into three ſorts, ſome being called External, ſome belonging to the Soul and ſome to the Body, we ſay, that thoſe concerning the Soul are the moſt Proper and chiefly Good; and the Actions and Energies of the Soul we place among things belonging

belonging to the Soul: So that Happineſs may be well Defined according to this Opinion, being antient and conſented to by the Studiers of Philoſophy; and rightly too, ſince ſome Actions and Energies are ſaid to be the End: for ſo they become part of the Goods of the Soul and not of Externals. And it is conſonant to Reaſon, that an happy Man ſhould Live Well and Do Well: for Happineſs ſeems to be a Sort of Living-Well and Doing-Well. And it appears, that all thoſe things, which have been thought requiſite to Happineſs, are comprehended in what we have Defined it to be. For to ſome it ſeems to be Virtue, to ſome Prudence, to others a ſort of Wiſdom; and to ſome all theſe, or ſome one of them; with Pleaſure or not without Pleaſure. Others again Define it to be an Affluence of External Goods. And of theſe Opinions, the Many and the Fooliſh take the laſt; The Few and the Judicious Perſons approve the former. And it is well conſiſtent with Reaſon, that neither are quite in the wrong in all, but that they are in the right as to ſome one thing or as to the moſt part of them. Our Definition therefore agrees with thoſe who ſay it is Virtue wholly or ſome Virtue: for an Energy according to Virtue muſt be a part of Virtue. But probably it differs not a little, whether to take the Beſt Thing to be a thing in Poſſeſſion or a thing in Uſe and whether a thing in Habit or a thing in Energy. For it is contingent, that Habit ſubſiſting may perform nothing, as to one ſleeping or ſome how inactive; but that Energy can be idle, is not to be thought; for of Neceſſity it will Act and Act well. As in the *Olympic* Games the hand-

ſomeſt and the ſtrongeſt preſent are not Crowned, but thoſe who contend for the Prizes; for ſome of theſe are Victorious: ſo thoſe, likewiſe who Act rightly, become Maſters of the things Honourable and good in Life. And their Life is Pleaſant of itſelf. For to be Pleaſed is one of thoſe things that belong to the Soul: and to each one is Pleaſant ſuch a thing, as he is ſaid to be a Lover of: as an Horſe, to one who Loves Horſes; a Show, to one who Loves Shows; and after the ſame manner alſo Juſt things, to one who Loves what is Juſt; and in general things according to Virtue, to one who Loves Virtue. The things Pleaſant to the Many are at Strife, on account of their not being Pleaſant by Nature; but the Pleaſant to the Lovers of Excellent things, are things Pleaſant by Nature: and ſuch are Actions according to Virtue: ſo that they are Pleaſant to them, even of themſelves. For their Life wants nothing more, like ſome Appendage, of Pleaſure; but poſſeſſes Pleaſure in itſelf: for to what has been ſaid let us make this Addition; he is not a Good man, who does not Delight in Honourable Actions; nor can one call him Juſt, who does not Delight in Doing what is Juſt; nor him Liberal, who does not Delight in Liberal Actions; and in like manner, as to the other Virtues. If it be ſo, Actions according to Virtue may be Pleaſant of themſelves and alſo Good and Excellent and each of theſe in the higheſt degree, if the Virtuous man Judges rightly of them, and he does Judge, as we have ſaid: Happineſs therefore is the Beſt and moſt Excellent and moſt Pleaſant Thing; and theſe are not to

be

be Defined, as Different, according to this Inſcription at *Delos*:

Moſt Excellent is that which is moſt Juſt;
The Beſt thing to be wiſh'd for is ſound Health;
T' enjoy, whate'er we Love, moſt Pleaſant is:

for all theſe are included in the beſt Energies. And the beſt Energies or the One Beſt of Energies, we ſay, Happineſs Is: and it appears nevertheleſs to want the Addition of external Goods, as we have ſaid: for it is impoſſible or not eaſy, that one unſupplied with Externals ſhould Do great Actions. For indeed many things are done, as it were by Inſtruments, by Friends and Wealth and Civil Power: But the being deſtitute of ſome things diſgraces what is happy as the not having Gentlemanlike Birth, or promiſing Children or a graceful Perſon: for he is not likely to be thoroughly Happy, who is deformed in Perſon, or of obſcure Birth, or who is ſolitary and without Children. And again rather leſs, if his Children or Friends are abandoned to Vice; or if being Good they ſhould die. Therefore, as we have ſaid, Happineſs ſeems to want by way of addition ſuch Sort of Proſperity: from whence ſome have put Good Fortune in the ſame Rank with Happineſs and others, Virtue.

CHAP. IX.

FROM whence Doubts ariſe, whether Happineſs is to be attained by Diſcipline or by Habit, or by Exercitation any other way; or whether it comes according to a ſort of Divine Allotment or by Fortune. If it be ſo, that any other thing is the Gift of Gods to Men, it is agreeable to Reaſon, that Happineſs alſo ſhould be of the Divine Giving; and eſpecially by how much it is the Beſt of all Human things. But this probably may be more proper to another Diſquiſition: and if it be not of the Divine Sending, but is gained by Virtue, and by a ſort of Diſcipline or Exercitation; it appears to be one of the moſt Divine things: for the Reward and End of Virtue appears to be the Beſt thing and ſomewhat Divine and Happy. And it may alſo be Common to Many. For it is poſſible through a ſort of Diſcipline and Application to be attained by all not incapacitated towards Virtue. If to be Happy by ſuch means is better than to be Happy by Fortune, it is agreeable to Reaſon, that Happineſs is attained by ſuch means; if it be ſo, that things according to Nature (as they have it in them to be moſt beautiful) are ſuch by Nature. And in like manner things according to Art and every Cauſe and eſpecially according to the Beſt Cauſe become ſuch, as they are, by the Art and Cauſe. To attribute the Greateſt and moſt Excellent thing to Fortune, would be very inconſiſtent. The Object of our Enquiry receives ſome Light

Light from the Definition. For Happineſs is ſaid to be ſome Energy of the Soul according to Virtue. And of the remaining Goods it is neceſſary, that ſome of them ſhould be part of it; and others are co-operative and uſeful, as Inſtruments. And theſe Reaſonings may be ſtrengthened by their Agreement with what was ſaid in the Beginning. For the End of the Art of Government we laid down to be the Beſt Thing; and this Art exerciſes moſt Attention to render the Citizens Some How Qualified and to make them Good men and ready to perform noble Actions. It is not without reaſon therefore that we do not call either an Ox, or an Horſe, or any other Animal, Happy: for none of them is by Nature capable to take part in ſuch an Energy. And for the ſame Cauſe neither is a Child Happy; for he is not able to perform ſuch things by reaſon of his Age: but Children ſaid to be Happy are called Happy through Hope, that they will be ſo. For, as we have ſaid, in order to conſtitute Happineſs there is need, both of Perfect Virtue, and of Perfect Life. For there are many Changes and various Caſualties in Life: and it is contingent, that one in moſt Proſperous circumſtances ſhould fall into great Calamities in Old age, as the Story is of *Priam* in the Heroic Writers: and one, who has ſuch Chances, and who Ends Miſerably, no man will call Happy.

CHAP. X.

SHALL not therefore any man be called Happy ſo long as he lives? but according to *Solon* it is neceſſary to ſee the End? if ſo, and if this is a Propoſition to be laid down; is a Man alſo then Happy, when he is dead? or is this entirely abſurd eſpecially in us who ſay that Happineſs is ſome Energy? and if we do not ſay that a dead man is Happy, neither does *Solon* mean it; but that one can certainly call a man Happy at that Period, as he is out of the reach of Evils and Misfortunes: and this too is liable to ſome Doubt: for there ſeems to be ſomething both Evil and Good, even to a dead man, if there may be ſuch to a man alive, but who has no Feeling; as Honours and Diſgraces, the Proſperities and Misfortunes of Children and of Deſcendants in general. And theſe Conſiderations too have a Difficulty: for it is Contingent to one, who has lived Happily to Old Age and who Ends agreeably to ſuch a Life, that many Changes may happen to his Deſcendants and that ſome of them, ſhould be Good and enjoy a Life according to their Worth and others, the contrary: it is manifeſt, that in proceſs of time they may be variouſly affected comparatively to the Anceſtors. But it would be abſurd that the dead perſon ſhould alſo change with them and ſhould be one while Happy and again Miſerable. And it is abſurd, that nothing relating to the Deſcendants ſhould be conſidered for any time, as appertaining to the Anceſtors.

But

But we muſt return to the former Doubt; for the preſent Queſtion may be ſoon explained from it. If it is neceſſary to ſee the End and then to call each man Happy, not as being Happy, but becauſe he was ſo formerly; how is it not abſurd, if, when he is Happy, he ſhall not be ſaid to be ſo with truth according to the thing, when it ſubſiſts in him? becauſe we will not call the Living Happy on account of the poſſible Changes and becauſe Happineſs is apprehended to be ſomewhat Permanent and not at all eaſy to be changed and becauſe Chances reverſed do come round again many times to the ſame perſons: for it is manifeſt, that, if we follow the train of Chances, we ſhall call the ſame perſon Happy and again Miſerable, declaring the Happy man to be a ſort of Chamœleon and like one reſting on a weak Foundation. Or is it no-wiſe right to keep Fortunes in view? for the Well and the Ill is not in them; but human Life ſtands in need of them to be added to it, as we have ſaid: but the Energies acording to Virtue, are Proper to Happineſs; and the contrary, to the contrary. And the preſent Diſquiſition favours this Reaſoning. For the Firmneſs of Human things exiſts in nothing ſo clearly, as in Energies according to Virtue. For they ſeem to be more Permanent than even the Sciences: and of Energies the moſt Honourable are too the moſt Permanent, becauſe Happy men do chiefly and conſtantly Live according to them. And this is probably the Cauſe that they are not liable to oblivion. The thing required will ſubſiſt in an Happy man; and he will be Happy throughout Life: for he will always, or preferably to all

things, Act and Think according to Virtue; and he will bear Fortunes with a grace and with entire decency every way, as being truly Good and like a Cube without blemiſh. Many things happening according to Fortune and differing according to greatneſs and littleneſs, it is manifeſt, that the little things of Good Fortune and likewiſe the little of the Contrary do not conſtitute the Importance of Life: but the great and many things being Well make Life more happy; for they are an additional Ornament to it; and the Uſe of them is both Beautiful and Virtuous: things happening on the reverſe, do afflict and vitiate what is Happy; for they bring on Sorrows and are impediments to many Energies. Nevertheleſs in theſe there ſhines forth what is Excellent, when any one bears many and great Misfortunes with Temper, not out of Inſenſibility, but from ſtrength of Mind and Magnanimity. If Energies govern Life, as we have ſaid, none of the Happy can ever be miſerable: for an Happy man will never do odious or baſe Actions; for we think that ſuch an one, as being truly Good and having preſence of mind, will bear with decency all Fortunes and on occaſions that happen will always Do what is beſt; as a good Commander will make uſe of the Army at hand in the moſt Soldierlike manner; and as a Shoemaker out of the Leather given to him will make the beſt Shoe that can be made out of it; and after the ſame manner will all other Artiſts whatſoever do. If it be ſo, an Happy man cannot become Miſerable, but may become not Happy, if he fall into ſuch Adverſe chances, as *Priam* did. Nor thus will the Happy man be various and changeable: for

for he will not be eaſily ſhaken out of Happineſs by common Misfortunes, but by many and great ones; and out of ſuch he cannot become again happy in a little time; but if he can be again Happy, it muſt be in a long and extended time, coming within ſuch a time to be again in great and proſperous Circumſtances. What therefore hinders us to call him Happy, who conſtantly Acts according to Perfect Virtue, and who is ſufficiently provided with External Goods, not for a contingent Space of time but for a perfect Life-time? Or muſt we Add; who ſhall Live ſo and End agreeably to ſuch a Life? ſince the Future is not apparent to us; but we propoſed Happineſs as the End and as a thing Perfect entirely every way. If it be ſo, we may call Happy thoſe of the Living, who have and ſhall continue to have the Qualifications by us mentioned, but Happy, as Men. And concerning theſe things, let it be Determined ſo far.

CHAP. XI.

THAT the Fortunes of Deſcendants and of Friends in general ſhould have no manner of connexion with the Dead, ſeems quite inconſiſtent with Friendſhip and contrary to the received Opinions. Events being many and having various differences and ſome of them extending themſelves more and ſome leſs, to diſtinguiſh them according to each poſſible caſe, ſeems a long and immenſe task: ſomewhat ſaid Univerſally and by way of ſketch may probably be ſufficient: if of the Misfortunes

to a man's ſelf, ſome have weight and are of moment in relation to Life, others may be compared to things light; ſo in like manner may this be ſaid of the Misfortunes to Friends in general. Every Suffering Differs much more, whether it happens to the Living or to the Dead, than whether monſtrous and cruel deeds are repreſented in Tragedies or are really perpetrated in Life. And from this Compariſon we muſt collect the Difference; or more probably by entering into a Diſquiſition concerning the Departed, whether they participate of any Good, or of the Oppoſites. For it is probable, that, if any thing whatſoever does reach them either Good or the contrary, it is ſomewhat abſolutely light and ſmall, or light and ſmall to them; but if nothing reaches them, yet the Good or Evil of their Friends is relative to them in ſome degree and ſenſe though not ſo as to make Happy thoſe who are not happy, nor to take away, what is Happy from thoſe who are Happy. The Proſperities therefore of Friends appear to have ſome ſort of Connexion with the Deceaſed; and likewiſe the Adverſities; and they have it in ſome manner and in ſome degree; but not ſo as to make Happy thoſe, who are not Happy, nor to do any other ſuch thing.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

THESE Things being diſcuſs'd, let us Conſider of Happineſs, whether it be one of the Laudable things or rather of the Honourable; for it is manifeſt, that it is not one of the Powers. Every thing Laudable ſeems to be Praiſed for it's being of ſome Quality and for it's being ſome how Relative. For we commend a Juſt man and a Brave man, and in general a Good man, and Virtue on account of their Deeds and Actions; and a Strong man, and one made for Running, and each perſon otherwiſe Qualified, for having naturally ſome Quality, and for having ſome how a Relation to ſomewhat Good and Virtuous. And this is manifeſt too from the Praiſes concerning the Gods: for theſe Praiſes, if ſuch as may be commonly Referred to Men, are ridiculous: and this happens, becauſe Praiſes are ſuch thro' Analogy, as we ſaid. If Praiſe is proper to ſuch things, it is manifeſt, that Praiſe is not proper to the beſt Things; but ſomewhat greater and better is proper to the beſt things, as it alſo appears: for we call the Gods Bleſſed and Happy; and the moſt Godlike of Men we call Bleſſed; and likewiſe the Divineſt of Goods we call Bleſſed: for no one commends Happineſs, as he commends what is Juſt; but calls it Bleſſed, as ſomething more Divine and more Excellent. And even *Eudoxus* ſeems to Reaſon well and conſiſtently concerning the Excellences in Pleaſure; for his Opinion was, that Pleaſure's not being Praiſed as one

of the Goods, indicates that it is Preferable to the Objects of Praiſe, and that God and Good are ſuch, as are above Praiſe; for to God and Good are all other things Referred: yet Praiſe is proper to the Virtues; for from thence Men are incited to do noble Actions: and Encomiums are proper to Works, as well of the Body as of the Mind. But to purſue theſe things accurately is probably more proper for thoſe exerciſed in Encomiums. It is manifeſt to us from what has been ſaid, that Happineſs is one of the Honourable and Perfect things. And it ſeems to be ſo for it's being a Principle: for in order to Happineſs all men do all things. And a Principle and that which is the cauſe of Goods, we lay down to be ſomewhat Honourable and Divine.

CHAP. XIII.

SINCE Happineſs is ſome Energy of the Soul according to Perfect Virtue, let us conſider of Virtue: for ſo we ſhall ſoon have clearer Notions of Happineſs. And he, who Practiſes the Art of Government according to Truth, ſeems to be moſt Exerciſed concerning Virtue: Examples whereof we have in the *Cretan* and *Lacedæmonian* Law-givers and in any others who may have been ſuch. If this Conſideration belongs to the Art of Government, it is manifeſt, that it may be an Enquiry according to our Purpoſe at the beginning. We are to conſider of Virtue, to wit, Human Virtue; for we alſo Enquired after Human Good

and

and Human Happineſs. By Human Virtue we mean, not that of the Body, but that of the Soul; and Happineſs we call an Energy of the Soul. If theſe things are ſo, it is manifeſt, that it behoves one exerciſing the Art of Government to have ſome ſort of knowledge of what belongs to the Soul, as one who ſets up to Cure the Eyes ought to have of the whole Body; and the rather, by how much the Art of Government is more Honourable and more Excellent than the Art of Medicine; and Phyſicians of refined Judgment take a great deal of pains in order to know the Body. So muſt one, who would underſtand the Art of Government, ſtudy the Soul: and he muſt ſtudy it for the ſake of what belongs to this Subject, and how far the Soul has a Fitneſs towards the things of the preſent Enquiry: for to enter into a more accurate Diſquiſition concerning the Soul would probably be more tedious than is neceſſary to what is now propoſed. Some things are alſo ſaid of the Soul amply enough in my Exoteric Diſcourſes and we muſt make uſe of them; as that one part of the Soul is without Reaſon and that the other part has Reaſon. Whether theſe are to be divided, as the Parts of the Body and every thing diviſible into Parts; or whether they are Two in thought only, being naturally Inſeparable, as in a Circumference the Convex and the Concave, makes no difference as to the preſent purpoſe. Of the Irrational, one part reſembles that which is common and belongs to Plants; I mean that which cauſes Nouriſhment and Growth: for ſuch a Power of Soul one may place in all things Nouriſhed and in Embryos and

the

the very ſame in Perfect Animals, for it is more agreeable to Reaſon, that this ſhould be it rather than any other Power. The Virtue of this appears to be in ſome ſort common and not properly Human: for this Part and this Power of the Soul ſeem to perform their Functions chiefly in the times of Sleep: but a Good and a Bad man are the leaſt to be diſtinguiſhed in Sleep; from whence they ſay, that for half of the time of Life the Happy differ nothing from the Miſerable. This is ſo not without cauſe: for Sleep is the Leiſure of the Soul as to that part whereby it is called Virtuous or Vitious; unleſs ſome Motions do any how a little reach it, and by this means the Dreams of the Juſt are more pleaſant than thoſe of common Men. But of theſe things; enough. The Nutritive Part muſt be laid aſide, as it is naturally without a ſhare of Human Virtue. And another Nature of the Soul ſeems to be Irrational, yet ſome how partaking of Reaſon: For we commend the Reaſon and that Part of the Soul having Reaſon both of a Continent and an Incontinent man; and rightly, for this exhorts men to the beſt things. But there appears in them alſo ſomewhat elſe by Nature excluſive of Reaſon, which combates with and contends againſt Reaſon: for as the Parts of the Body taken with the Palſy, when we would fain move them to the right, are unwillingly carried contrarywiſe to the left; ſo it is with the Soul: for the Efforts of the Incontinent are carried contrarywiſe. But in Bodies we ſee that which is wrong carried; in the Soul we do not ſee it. It may be judged with likelihood, that it is no otherwiſe in the Soul and that in the Soul there is

ſomewhat excluſive of Reaſon, that thwarts and goes againſt it. How this ſomewhat is different, is not to the purpoſe. And this too appears to partake of Reaſon, as we have ſaid: for this in the Continent man does obey Reaſon. And again this in a Temperate and in a Brave Man is probably more obedient to Reaſon: for all things are conſonant to Reaſon. Thus the Irrational Part appears to be twofold. For the Vegetative by no means partakes of Reaſon; but the Concupitive and Appetitive in general does ſome how partake ſo far as it is obedient and inclined to be perſwaded by Reaſon. For in this ſenſe we ſay, that we make account of a Father and of Friends, and not as of things Mathematical. That the Irrational part is ſome how perſwaded by Reaſon, every Admonition, as well as Objurgation and Exhortation Indicate. And, if it behoves us to ſay, that if this part of the Soul too has Reaſon, that part having Reaſon will alſo be two-fold; one properly and in itſelf; the other ſomewhat apt to hearken to Reaſon, as to a Father. Virtue alſo is divided according to this Difference: for of Virtues we call ſome, Mental; others, Moral; as Wiſdom, and Intelligence, and Prudence, Mental; Liberality, and Temperance, Moral: for ſpeaking of any one's Manners, we do not ſay that he is Wiſe or Intelligent, but that he is Gentle or Temperate: we alſo praiſe a Wiſe man from Habit, and of Habits thoſe, that are Praiſe-worthy, we call Virtues.

The End of the Firſt Book.

PAGE 8. l. 10. *inſtead of*, in which they can ſay any thing to be Prior and Poſterior, *read*, as to thoſe things in which they have admitted a Prior and a Poſterior.

NOTES on this Paſſage,

The *Platoniſts* allow, that there is not a common Idea as to thoſe things, in which there is a Prior and a Poſterior. *Acciaiolus.*

Fire and Hot Water agree in this, that both have Heat; but Fire is ſaid to be Prior to Water with regard to the Heat; becauſe Fire by Nature has always Heat, not ſo Water: Therefore *Plato* ſaid, that in relation to theſe Heat was no common Idea. *Giphanius.*

Note, *A.* means *Andronicus*, a *Greek* Paraphraſt of this Work, *E.* *Euſtratius* a *Greek* Commentator upon it: the laſt was a *Platoniſt*. Where theſe Letters are not, nor any other Reference, the Notes are taken from *Euſtratius* and Various *Latin* Annotators as to the Senſe, though not perhaps in their very words.

Notes on the Firſt Chapter.

METHOD] ſhows a Way with Reaſon to any Science or Truth, Practical or Speculative. *E.*

Prælection] is the Judgment of Man, two things lying before him, preferring one to the other according to Appetite and Habit. *E.*

Energies] are Actions or Doings or Operations, wherein the Ends are included; or ſuch, as that, when they ceaſe, nothing remains or nothing is further to be done: As Health reſtored is an Energy of the Art of Medicine, Money ſaved of the Art of Oeconomy, Victory obtained of the Art of Commanding an Army.

Energies] in another Senſe are Actions, or Doings or Operations with effect, but wherein the Ends are not included or ſuch as that, when they ceaſe, ſomething remains or ſomething is further to be done; As a Ship remains, after the Energy of the Art of Ship-Building employed about it; So a Bridle remains after the working or Energy of it: Alſo Military Horſemanſhip is an Effectual Energy, but ſomething is further to be done towards Victory.

Works] As a Ship, a Bridle.

Better] A Ship and a Bridle are better than the Energies or Operations employed on them; but this muſt be underſtood of thoſe very Energies: For the Ship and Bridle are not better than the Energies of the ſame Operators employed in other Ships and Bridles; neither are they better, than the Energies of the Arts of Ship Building and Bridle-making.

Architectonic] Like the Art of an Architect: For as he looking upon his Model of the Building Directs the Workmen to do thoſe things that carry the Model into Execution; ſo the Art of Commanding an Army or any other ſuch Art from its Proper End gives Rules to the other Arts under it. *A.*

Differs nothing] The Ends, whether they are Energies or ſomewhat elſe, are ſtill Ends; the Inferior Ends are governed by the Superiour; and the Laſt End is preferable to all antecedent Ends or Energies.

the ſaid Sciences] Meaning the Arts, Faculties and Operations mentioned in this Chapter.

Notes on the Second Chapter.

ARCHITECTONIC] See Notes on the firſt Chapter.

Powers] this Word means in this Place Arts or Faculties.

this Method] that is, the preſent Doctrine or Diſcourſe enquiring out the Way to Happineſs.

Notes on the Third Chapter.

LAW] means here not only Poſitive Laws, but Cuſtoms and Manners of Nations: As it was not Illegal among the *Spartans* to Steal, but rather Honourable; and tho' thoſe taken in Theft were Puniſhable, yet the Puniſhment was underſtood to be inflicted for their being taken, that is, for their not Stealing well: Two Reaſons are aſſigned for this Inſtitution; one, to teach them to Guard their own; the other to inure them to well-laid Enterprizes, ſuch as may be Practiſed againſt an Enemy.

taught in all] *Ariſtotle* is perhaps an Inſtance, that a Man by Nature, Education and Study may arrive at the Knowledge of all things known in his Time and Country, not ſo as to be a Profeſſor in each Science, but to be an Univerſally Good Judge, as many are Judges of Pictures, who cannot Paint.

Notes on the Fourth Chapter.

ANOTHER ſomewhat] Some think that God is meant here, as Good itſelf and Author of all Good; ſome think, that it is the Idea in the Human Mind, which makes things good; ſome, that it is Virtue with the Stoicks. Let us hear what *Ariſtotle* ſays in another work: *Pythagoras* Firſt attempted to diſcourſe of Virtue; but he did not diſcourſe of it rightly; for referring Virtues to Numbers he framed an improper Theory of the Virtues. For Juſtice is not a Number equally

equally even. After him *Socrates* next diſcourſed better and more fully of the Virtues: but neither did he rightly diſcourſe of them. For he made the Virtues to be Sciences; and this is a thing Impoſſible to Be. For all the Sciences are with Reaſon; and Reaſon is in the Mental part alone of the Soul: If ſo, all Virtues are in the Reaſoning part of the Soul: Thus, ſince he makes the Virtues Sciences, it comes out, that he takes away the part of the Soul Analagous to Virtue, and doing this he takes away alſo Paſſion and Manners. Wherefore by his Doctrine he did not rightly Touch the Virtues. Afterwards *Plato* divided the Soul into two Parts, the one having Reaſon, the other Irrational; Rightly! and he gave to each Part ſuitable Virtues: thus far alſo, Well! but after this again not rightly! For he intermixed Virtue with treating of Good in the Abſtract: not rightly! For Good in that ſenſe is not Proper to Virtue; for one diſcourſing ſimply of things Being and Truth, ought not to mention Virtue. For there is nothing common both to one and to the other. *Magn. Moral.* lib. 1. cap. 1.

From and To Principles] Since the Diſcourſe is of Principle (for Principle and Cauſe is the End of Actions; for on account of the End we do ſomething) we muſt enquire after what manner a juſt Deſcription of Principle is to be given. For there is a Difference. And firſt we ſhall a little Treat of Cauſes. For of Cauſes, there is a Final, a Formal, a Material, an Efficient. And the Efficient Cauſe is the Energy of the Workman, the Material is the Wood and Stones of which a Building conſiſts, the Formal is the Model of the Building, the Final is that for which the Building was erected. Since theſe are Cauſes to the other things of exiſting, they are alſo Cauſes of knowing the other things and by the Cauſes the Effects can be known. For if any one knows the Art of the Work-man according to which he performed the Building, he will know, whether the Building be good or bad, ſo far as appertains to the Art: and he who knows the Matter and the Form in like manner: and again knowing, what was the End of the Building, we ſhall know, whether the Building be good or bad in that reſpect. And the ſame thing comes to paſs the reverſe way, from knowing the Effects to know the Cauſes: for he who knows the Cauſe from the Effect will know the Art of the Work-man, and the other things in like manner. So that there is a Neceſſity that Reaſonings ſhould be twofold, one from the Effects ſhowing the Prin-

ciples, the other from the Principles ſhowing the Effects: we ſhall uſe either of the Methods according to Occaſion. And we ſhall Demonſtrate from Principles, when they are manifeſt and the reverſe way, when the Effects are more apparent. And on this account *Plato* did rightly make a Queſtion and Doubt (as it is a thing not indifferent to every caſe) whether the way of Demonſtration proceeds from Principles or to Principles, as in a Courſe from the Judges of the Race to the End, or contrarywiſe. The way therefore being twofold, from whence muſt we Begin? Or is it manifeſt, that we muſt Begin from the Effects, to wit, Political Actions, of which the Principle and Cauſe is a Political End? For it behoves us to Begin from things Known, not in Nature, but to us. For the things known in Nature are Principles and Cauſes; for Nature firſt exhibits them and is firſt intent upon them: the Effects are known to us. Thus our Reaſoning will be clear flowing out of things known to us. *A.*

Notes on the Fifth Chapter.

A Paradox] which the Stoics maintained; *Zeno* Author of this Sect was cotemporary with *Ariſtotle.*

Encyclia] Theſe Pieces are loſt; but there are Authors who have given an account of them: and they ſay that Happineſs is treated of therein, and that this Queſtion is alſo diſcuſſed, whether one can call a man Happy from Habits alone according to Virtue, ſuppoſing him to do nothing in Life according to the Habits. *E.*

Notes on the Sixth Chapter.

GOOD] *Plato* enquiring about the Principle of All things Being, Defined it to be One and Ineffable and the Good; and he Declared every thing Being to be from It, as being Above, excelling and comprehending All things in It's ſelf, in a manner not to be underſtood and ſupereſſentially; making Progreſſions towards All things not going out of It's ſelf: Producing All things Intelligible and Intellectual, Rational and Irrational, thoſe having Life any how and the totally Unanimated, and thoſe which have

have ſome obſcure notion that they Are; through the Excellence of It's ſelf, not by chuſing or willing concerning the Production, but by Being It ſelf (as the Sun gives Light by his very Preſence not chuſing nor willing) ſo as to Be the very Beginning and End of all things, that are ſaid in any manner to Be; the Beginning, as All things have their Being from It, the End, as through It, All things are expanded towards It, and aim at It, according to the nature of each thing: as It is that which makes All things Perfect and Good; *Plato* alſo ſays, that It is the Firſt Good, as being Eſſentially the Good, which all things aim at. *E.*

Univerſally] is not meant here as in Theories of Logic; for there it is in Many and of Poſterior Origin; here it is before Many, as præſubſiſting before them and the Many receiving Subſiſtence, Relative to it. For ſo the *Platoniſts* ſaid introducing Reaſons having Subſiſtence, Divine, Intelligent; Relative to which they ſaid All things Material Were and were Created which Reaſons they alſo called Specieſes and Ideas and Wholes and Ideas Univerſally, præſubſiſting before the Specieſes in Bodies, Abſtracted from all Bodies, Exiſting in the Mind of God the Author, who Imprints on Matter ſome other things according to them: theſe Reaſons they ſaid to Be, Univerſally, and Wholes, when each of theſe being One has many taking riſe from it, and according to it in Body and Materialized to which Many this One Univerſally was ſaid to Relate, not ſenſibly, but intellectually; Univerſally, as ſubſiſting in Many Abſtracted, which had their origin according to it; and Whole as of Parts placed in Order in a Reaſon, which Parts are Referred to that Reaſon as an Whole not compounded of them nor to be conceived in them, but exiſting before them and Remaining of it's ſelf and having them Referred to it ſelf, as to their Proper Wholeneſs: for an Whole before the Parts is ſaid to be thoſe Ideas (ſince each of them ſubſiſted before Many) which had an origin Relative to that Whole, being Ideas moſt ſimple and not Material. *E.*

Ideas] according to the *Platoniſts* lie as Models before the Creator, ſo that looking upon them as præpunctuations and prior Characters he frames things Material; being themſelves Reaſons Creative and as it were the Intellgencies and Theorems of what Proceeds

ceeds from them; Not as certain Qualities or Sciences coming from without, but properly Being and ſubſiſting; both Effectual and Intellectual and Archetypes of things Material: for they ſay, that all Specieſes are Divine Reaſons, ſome of an inferior Claſs, ſome ſuperexcellent, and that none is ſo ineffectual but that it ſhows its proper Energy according to Progreſſion into thoſe underneath it, as it is Ordained. Even Nature is a Species, but Inſeparable from Bodies, entering through Bodies and inwardly Forming and Diſpoſing them: but they ſay, that Ideas do not ſo; but are Reaſons ſubſiſting really and ſtanding high, wholly above both Bodies and Natures, according to ſome Divine proportion, through which proportion they ſay, the Creator performs His Material Working to Effect. *E.*

Both being Friends] *Plato* and Truth. *Petitus* from *Athenæus* ſays, that, Truth is a Friend, was an old Greek Proverb. *Miſc. Obſ.* pag. 34, 35.

Idea of each thing and of Man] is the thing and Man according to the *Platoniſts* more than the thing and Man obvious to our Senſes; becauſe Ideas, as they ſay, are the eternal Models and Cauſes of periſhable things and Men.

another Diſcourſe and part of Philoſophy] Metaphyſics.

Pythagoreans] The Coordination of Firſt Principles according to them taken from *Ariſtotle*'s Metaphyſics. B. 1. Ch. 5. is thus,

1 Limit	1 Unlimitable
2 Odd	2 Even
3 One	3 Many
4 Right	4 Left
5 Male	5 Female
6 Quieſcent	6 Moved
7 Straight	7 Crooked
8 Light	8 Darkneſs
9 Good	9 Evil
10 Square or Cube	10 Longer on one ſide

Notes on the Seventh Chapter.

Præelection] See Notes on the firſt Chapter, when this Word occurs.

Energy] a Perfect Action, a tenour of Actions, a conſtant Acting: See Notes on the firſt Chapter, when this word occurs.

a Perfect Life] Suppoſe not leſs than ſeven or eight Years, or ſo long, as may be eſteemed a Life-time.

Method] See Notes on the firſt and ſecond Chapters, when this word occurs.

Notes on the Eighth Chapter.

Poſſeſſion, Uſe, Habit, Energy] One may be Poſſeſſed of Riches and not Uſe them; one may have Virtue and not exerciſe it effectually for want of Occaſion and Inſtruments, or through an Inactive Diſpoſition.

Inſcription] on the Porch of *Apollo*'s Temple. *Ariſtot. Eudem.* lib. 1. cap. 1.

Notes on the Tenth Chapter.

Cube] Proverbially ſaid of a Perſon ſteady in Virtue: *Horace* has applied a Sphære in a like ſenſe.

Perfect Life-time] See Notes on the ſeventh Chapter, when this Expreſſion occurs.

Happy, as men] the *Greek* Epithet for Happy in this place is commonly given to the Gods.

Note on the Eleventh Chapter.

If nothing reaches them, &c.] it is ſaid in the preceeding Chapter, that the Proſperities and Misfortunes of Children and of Deſcendants in general may be Good and Evil to a man alive, who has no Feeling;

Feeling; and that it is abſurd, that nothing relating to the Deſcendants ſhould for any time be conſidered as appertaining to the Anceſtors; which alſo in this Chapter is ſaid to be inconſiſtent with Friendſhip and the common Opinions: all which with the other Reaſonings relative to this Paſſage favour the meaning put upon it in the Tranſlation.

Note on the Twelfth Chapter.

POWERS] Magiſtracy, Wealth, Strength, Beauty are ſo called, becauſe they are Good only in Power being capable of being miſapplied, *Ariſtot. Mag. Mor. Lib.* 1. *Cap.* 2.

Notes on the Thirteenth Chapter.

EXOTERIC] ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s Treatiſes ſo called, becauſe publiſhed abroad, or becauſe out of the common Order anſwering Queſtions put to him; his other Treatiſes are called, Acroamatic, becauſe delivered to his Hearers only.

make Account] the *Greek* word for Reaſon ſignifies Account alſo, as to make Account of, or Eſteem, any one; and it likewiſe means Account Arithmetically and Proportion Mathematically.

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End of Notes on the First Book.

ERRATA.

Page 9. *Line* 5. *Blot out* the Comma after,, commanding
P. 22. *L.* 2. *for* it is *Read* is it
P. 31. *L.* 16. *Blot out*, if, before,, this part